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Abstract: With the emergence of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) there is a growing need for safety 
standards and regulatory frameworks to manage the risks associated with their operations. The primary 
driver for airworthiness regulations (i.e., those governing the design, manufacture, maintenance and 
operation of UAS) are the risks presented to people in the regions overflown by the aircraft. Models 
characterising the nature of these risks are needed to inform the development of airworthiness regulations. 
The output from these models should include measures of the collective, individual and societal risk. A brief 
review of these measures is provided. Based on the review, it was determined that the model of the operation 
of an UAS over inhabited areas must be capable of describing the distribution of possible impact locations, 
given a failure at a particular point in the flight plan. Existing models either do not take the impact 
distribution into consideration, or propose complex and computationally expensive methods for its 
calculation. A computationally efficient approach for estimating the boundary (and in turn area) of the 
impact distribution for fixed wing unmanned aircraft is proposed. A series of geometric templates that 
approximate the impact distributions are derived using an empirical analysis of the results obtained from a 6-
Degree of Freedom (6DoF) simulation. The impact distributions can be aggregated to provide impact 
footprint distributions for a range of generic phases of flight and missions. The maximum impact footprint 
areas obtained from the geometric template are shown to have a relative error of typically less than 1% 
compared to the areas calculated using the computationally more expensive 6DoF simulation. Computation 
times for the geometric models are on the order of one second or less, using a standard desktop computer. 
Future work includes characterising the distribution of impact locations within the footprint boundaries. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) have emerged as a viable technology in numerous applications, which 
include surveillance, infrastructure inspection, environmental monitoring, agriculture, search and rescue and 
law enforcement. Like any technology, the operation of UAS has associated risks. From [1], the primary 
hazards associated with the operation of UAS are a:  
 
a) collision between the Unmanned Aircraft (UA) and a Conventionally-Piloted Aircraft (CPA) situated 
on the ground or in the air; or  
b) controlled or uncontrolled impact of the UA with terrain or objects on the terrain (e.g., people or 
structures). 
 
These hazards have a number of associated risks. Of primary concern are the risks to the third party people 
on-board CPA or people on the ground in the regions overflown, respectively. The high-level safety 
objective is that UAS demonstrate, as a minimum, an Equivalent Level of Safety (ELoS) to that 
demonstrated by CPA operations [2]. A comprehensive framework of safety regulations to manage the risks 
and in turn provide assurances that UAS demonstrate an ELoS has yet to be developed. In its absence 
National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) have imposed significant restrictions on the operation of UAS. These 
restrictions include limiting UAS operations to airspace segregated from all other airspace users; limiting 
UAS operations to uninhabited regions; or prohibiting the operation of UAS altogether. Thus, the 
development and promulgation of a framework of safety policy, regulations and standards to manage the 
risks associated with UAS operations is essential to the realisation of a sustainable civil UAS market. 
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Foundational to the development of justifiable safety regulations for UAS is a comprehensive understanding 
of the nature and level of the risks. Such an understanding is typically provided through the completion of a 
risk analysis [3]. For regulations relating to the operation of UAS alongside other airspace users and their 
integration to the existing civil airspace system (e.g., rules of the air, procedures and equipage), the primary 
risks of concern are those associated with the hazard of a mid-air collision between an UAS and a CPA. For 
airworthiness regulations (i.e., those primarily relating to the design, manufacture, maintenance and 
operation of UAS), the primary risks of concern are those that associated with a discontinuance of flight. The 
scope of the paper is limited to the latter of these regulatory areas. More specifically, the work presented in 
this paper is part of a larger program of research supporting the development of a suitable airworthiness 
regulatory framework for civil UAS (described in [4]). The regulatory framework described in [4] requires a 
top-level assessment of the risk to people on the ground across the complete spectrum of foreseeable UAS 
CONcepts of OPerationS (CONOPS). Such a broad and high-level assessment does not rely on detailed 
information on the UAS, its sub-systems, failure modes, or flight path or on the distribution of people on the 
ground. Such information is seldom available or practical to obtain for such a diverse range of possible 
systems, operations and operating environments (as illustrated in the histograms provided in [4]). 
 
A literature review revealed an array of statistical and causal models for characterising the risk to people on 
the ground due to aviation activities. These include models specific to the operation of UAS (e.g., [5-12]), 
CPA (e.g., [13-20]), manned and unmanned spacecraft (e.g., [21-23]) and general debris models (e.g., [24]). 
For UAS, there is limited historical accident, incident and operational data upon which to base a meaningful 
statistical assessment of the safety performance of UAS operations over inhabited areas. However, a list of 
some notable UAS accidents are provided in [1]. Thus, the risk analysis of UAS operations over inhabited 
areas has relied heavily upon a number of high-level causal risk models.  
 
The comprehensive management of the risks associated with the operation of UAS over inhabited areas 
requires consideration of the risks to individuals and groups [4]. A model of UAS operations over inhabited 
areas should therefore support the “population-based” [25] measures of: Individual Risk (IR), Collective 
Risk (CR) and Societal Risk (SR). However, none of the existing works identified provide assessments of all 
three measures. The first section of this paper (§2) summarises the different measures and, at a high-level, 
the different factors that need to be included in a high-level model characterising the risks of UAS operations 
over inhabited areas. 
 
Key to providing an assessment of the IR and for characterising measures of SR is knowledge of the 
distribution of the potential impact locations of the UA given a critical failure. Traditionally, such a model 
has been difficult to characterise, often requiring large Monte Carlo simulations of the trajectory of the 
system for a particular combination of failure modes. Existing models have either made assumptions as to 
the nature of the distribution or have not taken it into consideration, reducing the fidelity of the measures or 
limiting the types of measures that can be obtained from the model, respectively. In the second section of this 
paper (§3), we describe the development of geometric templates that can be used to approximate the 
boundary and area of the impact distribution of a fixed wing aircraft under particular failure conditions. The 
approach uses a 6-Degree of Freedom (6DoF) model to characterise the boundary of the impact distribution, 
geometric “templates” are then fitted to the boundary through the use of empirical methods. 
 
2.  OVERVIEW OF METRICS 
 
“Industry is becoming increasingly aware of the benefits of a balanced risk perspective that considers both 
individual and societal risk.”[26] As such, the quantification of measures of IR, CR and SR and their use as 
the basis for expressing quantitative risk criteria is becoming commonplace in the risk management of a wide 
range of industries. In relation to aviation, these include the assessment and management of the risks around 
airports [19, 20], mid-air collisions [25, 27], and the risks due to flight test range activities (e.g., [28]).  
 
So as to ensure a comprehensive management of the risks to people over-flown, Clothier et al. [4] advocate 
the consideration of measures of IR, CR and SR in the development of airworthiness regulations for UAS. 
The majority of existing models (e.g., [5-8, 11, 12]) characterise the risk associated with UAS operations 
through measures of the casualty or fatality expectation per flight hour (a measure of the CR). Models 
presented in [6, 9, 29] provide measures of the IR, however, none provide measures of the SR. The objective 
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of the following sub-sections is to briefly introduce some of the commonly used “population-based” [25] 
measures of CR, IR and SR and how their calculation can be related to a high-level model of the risks of 
UAS operations over inhabited areas.  
 
2.1. Collective Risk 
 
Measures of the Collective Risk (CR) are the most commonly used in the existing UAS ground risk models. 
CR measures describe the aggregate risk to a population of people. The measures used are the expected 
number of casualties or fatalities per flight hour [5-8], herein referred to as the Casualty Expectation (CE). 
For a given point in a UAS operation, a measure of CE can be determined from:  
 
 𝐶𝐸 = 𝜆  𝑃(!|!)𝑃(!|!,!) (1) 
where: 
 
a) 𝝀  is the expected number of failures per unit exposure (typically per flight hour). This is based on 
the assumption that failures occur continuously and independently at a constant rate  𝝀 (i.e., failures 
can be described as a Poisson process). For small values of 𝝀, the probability of failure PF in an 
interval of time ∆𝒕  can be approximated by: 
 𝑃!   ≈ 𝜆∆𝑡 (2) 
 
b) 𝑷𝑺|𝑭 is the probability that the UA strikes a person given the failure. Assuming that the UAS will 
impact the ground and that people are equally distributed across the area, 𝑷𝑺|𝑭 is replaced by the 
expected number of people struck per failure N, and is given by: 
 
 𝑁 = 𝜌𝐴! (3) 
 
 where, 𝝆 is the population density and 𝑨𝑳 is the lethal area as given in [10]. 
 
c) 𝑷(𝑳|𝑺,𝑭) is the probability of a level of loss (i.e., casualty or fatality) given a strike. The existing 
models [5, 6, 9] make the conservative assumption that someone struck by an UA is killed. There are 
existing models characterising the probability of a casualty or fatality as a result of an impact [30-
32], however incorporating these models requires consideration of the UA state (i.e., position, 
velocity, attitude) and frangibility of the UA at the point of impact. At a high-level, 𝑷(𝑳|𝑺,𝑭) can also 
take into account the potential protection offered to those people who are sheltered within different 
types of structures. For example, the model specified in [5] incorporates sheltering through the 
inclusion of a probability of penetration factor. Modelling sheltering also requires models 
characterising the proportion of a population (or probability that a particular individual) resides 
within different types of shelters. An example of such a model is provided in [21]. 
 
2.2. Individual Risk 
 
IR describes the risk to single exposed entities and has been defined as “the frequency at which an individual 
may be expected to sustain a given level of harm from the realisation of specified hazards.”[33] One method 
for calculating the IR, referred to here as the average IR, IRµ is given in Eq.4. 
 
 IRµ = !"! = !"!!! (4) 
 
where: 𝝆 is the population density in the exposed area and 𝑨𝒇 is the total area an impact can occur in, CE is 
the casualty expectation as given in Eq.(1). It is important to note that the calculation of IRµ is different to 
the concept of IR presented in [19, 34, 35], which define IR as: “the probability that an average unprotected 
person, permanently present at a certain location, is killed due to an accident resulting from a hazardous 
activity” [35] and herein referred to as the theoretical IR, IRT. Critical to the calculation of IRT are the 
assumptions of an “average unprotected person”[35] and a permanent exposure to a given hazard. Based on 
these assumptions, IRT essentially represents the path characteristics [36] of the phenomena causing loss. By 
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assuming a person is always exposed, whether they are present or not, means that IRT is predominantly a 
“property of the location” [35] as opposed to the behaviour and characteristics of any one individual. In the 
case of the modelling of UAS operations, IRT is primarily a function of the impact distribution of the UA and 
its properties on impact (e.g., energy). As described by Pasman and Vrijling [37] “The IR does not change 
even if it is proven that nobody can be present at the moment of the accident.” Clearly, the properties and 
assumptions underpinning IRµ are different to those required to determine IRT; IRµ is a function of the total 
number of people exposed, whereas IRT is independent of the people exposed. IRT is typically represented as 
iso-risk contours around a hazard source (i.e., the point in the flight plan where the UAS experiences a 
failure). A measure of the CR can be determined from IRT by taking into account the presence of a 
population. An example of this is described in Laheij et al. [38] and Piers [39], who describe the expected 
value of the potential loss of life through the integration of the spatial intersection of the distributions 
describing IRT and the population density, 𝝆. 
 
2.3. Societal Risk 
 
Measures of the Societal Risk (SR) [40] have gone by a number of names, for example, they have been 
referred to as risk profiles [41], FN-Curves [19, 42], measures of group risk [37] or catastrophic risk [28]. 
When used as the basis for defining safety criteria they have been referred to as: Farmer curves (after Frank 
Farmer who was the first to propose the use of SR metrics as safety criteria for the siting of nuclear power 
stations [43]) or FN-Criterion lines [42]. SR describes “the relationship between frequency and the number 
of people suffering from a specified level of harm in a given population from the realisation of specified 
hazards.” [33] Ale and Piers [19] describe SR as “the chance that in a single accident in the hazard source, a 
certain number of victims is exceeded. It is expressed as the relationship between the number of people 
killed and the chance per year that this number is exceeded.” Thus, SR is not a single measure but a 
tabularisation or graphical representation of the frequency of accidents by number of casualties (e.g., injuries 
or fatalities).  
 
SR can be calculated by tabularising the outcomes (i.e., number of causalities or fatalities) from a complete 
set of scenarios. To evaluate the SR associated with the occurrence of a failure at a particular point in the 
flight of the UAS the complete set of potential loss scenarios needs to be evaluated and the discrete outcomes 
tabularised against the probability of their occurrence (e.g., the potential consequence resulting from an 
impact at all possible impact locations). Measures of CR, including the CE, can then be determined from SR 
curves as described in [40, 42]. 
 
2.4. Model Requirements 
 
Based on this brief review of existing metrics, a clear requirement has emerged: a model of the spatial 
distribution of the potential UA impact location given the occurrence of a failure is required. Such a model is 
needed to support the measurement of IRµ (Eq.4), to determine a measure of IRT and to measure the SR for a 
failure at a given point in the operation of a UAS over an inhabited area. 
 
Given a failure, characterising the flight trajectory from the point of failure to the impact location on the 
ground is dependent on a large number of factors. These factors can include: the effect of the failure on the 
aerodynamic performance of the UA, wind, input commands and actions of the UAS crew, terrain and the 
occurrence of subsequent failures. The modelling of the trajectory under failure often requires the generation 
of complex dynamic models (e.g., kinematic models, dynamic event trees etc.) in order to account for all 
these factors. Due to the large parameter space and associated parameter uncertainties, the calculation of the 
impact distribution typically requires a Monte Carlo simulation (e.g., an example of a Monte Carlo-based 
approach is provided in [21]), which can be extremely computationally expensive. As such, most of the 
existing models identified in the literature do not take into consideration the impact footprint [5, 7, 8, 11, 12], 
consequently limiting the measures of risk that can be determined from the outputs of the simulation of the 
model. Existing models [6, 9] have made simplifying assumptions on the boundary or distribution of impact 
locations. For example, [6] models the boundary of the impact distribution as the projection of an ellipse 
centred on the aircraft, with semi and major axes defined in relation to the glide ratio. Rather than assume a 
uniform probability of impact within the elliptical impact footprint boundary, [6] models the probability of 
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impact as a bivariate normal distribution. The approach adopted in [6], however, is computationally 
expensive and requires detailed information on the flight path and the nature of the terrain over-flown.  
 
In the absence of historical data to characterise impact distributions (as is described in [20] for the modelling 
of public safety zones around runways at airports) or a large and complex causal model (as described in [17, 
18]) there is need for an alternative and computationally efficient approach for modelling the impact 
distribution boundary. One such approach is explored in the next section.  
 
3. A NOVEL IMPACT FOOTPRINT BOUNDARY MODEL 
 
An impact footprint is needed to comprehensively characterise the spatial dependency of a person's exposure 
to the hazard of a UAS crash. The model is to be used to support the development of airworthiness 
regulations for a wide range of UAS, and as such it is assumed that detailed information on the UA and 
operational information including the exact flight path and hence terrain and population centres overflown, 
are not available. Therefore, it is not feasible to determine the impact distribution. However, for many 
failures, it is still possible to ascertain the boundary of the impact distribution and in turn, the area exposed to 
the hazard of a crashing UAS. In this section, we describe an approach for characterising the boundary of the 
impact footprint distribution. 
 
A simulation of a 6DoF aircraft model is used to determine the boundary of possible ground impact locations 
for an UA, given a failure. The footprint boundary is generated for two case-study fixed wing aircraft: a 
Cessna 172 and Aerosonde UA. The 6DoF simulation is described in §3.2. A description of the 6DoF 
aerodynamic model is provided in [44]. 
 
The 6DoF simulation is computationally expensive to evaluate over a large number of missions and flight 
profiles. Further, it requires a detailed model of the aircraft, information that is not readily available for all 
UAS. In section §3.3, a series of geometric primitives (i.e., footprint templates) are developed to 
approximate the footprint boundaries determined by the 6DoF simulation. In §3.4 the footprints are 
extrapolated to determine the aggregated footprint boundary for different phases of a flight (e.g., 
climb/descent, cruise and loiter). The geometric footprints are computationally efficient to calculate, have a 
low relative error (compared to the results determined from the 6DoF model), can be determined from 
relatively high-level information on the UAS, and can be used to evaluate the risk for a range of mission 
profiles.  
 
3.1. Applicable Failures 
 
Not all failures have a bounded impact distribution. A bounded impact distribution is typically associated 
with an Unrecoverable Flight Critical Event (UFCE) [6] such as structural failures, propulsion failures, 
failures in flight control systems, power systems or the inadvertent activation of flight termination systems, 
etc. (e.g., see Table 1.1-1 [11]). Typical emergency operating procedures often attempt to contain the UAS 
and its impact location to a known region by shutting down the engine or placing the aircraft into a pre-
programmed descent profile. As such, these emergency procedures also have a bounded impact footprint 
distribution. 
 
3.2. 6DoF Impact Footprint Boundary Model 
 
A 6DoF aerodynamic model of the aircraft can be used to determine the maximum extents of the impact 
distribution (full derivation of the 6DoF model can be found in [44]) for the applicable failures described in 
§3.1. Using the 6DoF model, the set of possible impact points is obtained by simulating the complete set of 
feasible gliding descent trajectories. Specifically: 
 
a) It is assumed that the descent trajectory comprises a turn onto a given heading angle φ  followed by a 
straight line glide (i.e., constant flight path angle); 
b) The simulation was completed for all values of φ  on (0,2π) with the scenario of φ  = 0 corresponding 
to a straight line glide (i.e., no turn);   
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c) The simulation was completed for a range of aircraft bank angles, airspeeds, flight path angles and 
initial altitudes; 
d) The simulation was completed for both case study aircraft (i.e., Cessna 172 and Aerosonde UA). 
 
Logically, optimal descent trajectories (i.e., those with the greatest displacement from the starting point) are 
achieved when the aircraft flies at the minimum flight path angle (corresponding to the minimum drag 
velocity for the particular aircraft) and by executing a turn with a bank angle of 𝝁 =   𝝅/𝟒. The maximum 
footprint boundary is then obtained by connecting the impact points for each of the optimal trajectories. 
Some example maximum footprint boundaries for the Cessna 172 are presented in Fig.1 for a range of 
starting altitudes. 
 
From Fig.1, it can be seen that the footprint area grows monotonically with height Above Ground Level 
(AGL). At low altitudes, the footprint is shaped somewhat like a pie slice (circular sector). This is because 
the aircraft hits the ground before it can complete its turn (e.g., Fig.1a). As altitude increases, the footprint 
evolves into a more rounded, almost circular shape (e.g., Fig.1d). This occurs as there is sufficient height 
AGL such that the length of the straight-line glides is significantly larger then that of the turning circle of the 
aircraft. Note that the forward half of the footprint is slightly different in shape to that of the back half. In 
addition, the footprint shape and area varies for the different aircraft. Specifically, for the same initial 
conditions, the footprint area for the Aerosonde is significantly greater than that for the Cessna 172 due to 
the superior glide performance of the Aerosonde. 
 
3.3 Approximating the 6DoF Footprint 
 
The footprints determined using the 6DoF simulator (e.g., Fig.1) require a detailed aerodynamic model of the 
aircraft. In order to calculate the impact distribution boundary for a wide range of UAS and operational 
profiles (e.g., altitudes etc.), a simpler and more computationally efficient method for approximating the 
maximum boundary of the impact distribution is needed. This section describes the development of a set of 
geometric “templates” that can be used to approximate the maximum boundary of the impact distribution for 
fixed wing aircraft. As can be seen from Fig.1, more than one geometric template is needed to approximate 
the footprints achieved from different initial height AGL. Two models are determined: a high altitude model 
and a low altitude model. The transition altitude (i.e., the height AGL at which the high altitude model 
provides a better approximation of the footprint boundary than that of the low altitude model) is empirically 
determined and is a function of the aircraft turn and glide performance. 
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Figure 1. Impact Footprint Determined Using a Simulation of a 6DoF Model of a Cessna 172 from an Initial Height 
Above Ground Level of (a) 100ft, (b) 200ft, (c) 300ft and (d) 500ft. 
 
3.3.1 High Altitude Model 
 
A dual half-ellipse model is proposed for approximating the maximum boundary of the impact distribution at 
altitudes above the transition altitude. A half-ellipse is used to model the forward (positive along track) half 
of the footprint (with major and minor axis lengths a1 and b1 respectively). Another half-ellipse is used to 
model the back (negative along track) half of the footprint (with major and minor axis lengths a2 and 𝒃𝟐 = 𝒃𝟏). The geometric model is illustrated in Fig.2. Note, in Fig.2 that A is the initial aircraft location, AC 
is the turn radius rt for the chosen bank angle, CD = a1, CB = b1 = b2, EC = a2. C is the centre point for the 
forward and back ellipses. 
 
The points E, B and D are the footprint extremities in the negative x (along track), positive y (across track) 
and positive x directions, respectively. The parameters a1, b1 and a2 approximate the extremities of the true 
footprint. Both the forward and back ellipses are centred on C, which is located at a distance rt along the 
track from the initial point (origin) A. Estimating the values of the above parameters is based on the 
assumption of a trajectory comprising a turn and a glide at the minimum drag velocity. This trajectory 
corresponds to the maximum glide distance and minimum glide path angle (and hence maximum extent of 
the impact distribution). The trajectory varies according to the initial starting altitude AGL. rt is the turn 
radius and can be determined assuming a coordinated turn. The length of the arc traversed in this turn is a 
function of rt and the turn angle φ . By using an empirically determined scalar factor of the glide path angle 
during the turn, it is possible to ascertain (through trigonometry) the loss in height in the execution of the 
turn. Using trigonometry, the remaining height AGL and flight path angle can then be used to determine the 
ground track distance of the glide dg. b1 can be determined as the sum of rt and dg for a turn angle φ  = 90° 
and similarly, a2 can be determined in the same manner for φ  =180°. a1 corresponds to dg with a turn angle 
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𝐴!"#$  !""#$%& =   𝜋2 𝑎!𝑏! + 𝜋2 𝑎!𝑏! (5) 
 
Figure 2. Geometric Primitive of the Maximum Boundary of the Impact Distribution at High Altitudes  
 
3.3.2 Low Altitude Model 
 
Eq.5 does not apply at lower altitudes where the air vehicle is unable to turn onto a heading angle of 𝝓 = 𝟏𝟖𝟎° before impacting the ground (e.g., Fig.1a, Fig.1b, and Fig.1c). Recall that the failure trajectory is 
assumed to comprise a coordinated turn and a glide segment. If the glide segment has a distance of less than 
or equal to zero, the pie slice model is used instead (Fig.3), i.e., the transition from the high altitude to low 
altitude model occurs when the glide component of the trajectory is zero, i.e., dg = 0. The model illustrated in 
Fig.3. approximates the footprint for low altitudes using a circle sector (e.g., pie slice) centred on the initial 
position A with radius equal to the maximum glide distance dMax. The pie slice half-angle θ , which through 
simple geometry, is half the turn angle. It is found that θ  can be estimated by setting dt as an empirically 
determined factor of dmax. Then, dt and rt can be used to determine φ  and hence θ . The resultant footprint 
area is: 
 
𝐴!"#  !"#$% = 𝜃𝑑!"#!  (6) 
 
 
Figure 3. Pie Slice Geometric Approximation 
 
3.4. Phase of Flight Footprint 
 
The geometric templates described in §3.3 are for a single point in a flight plan. A mission can be described 
by a series of simplified phases, namely: cruise, loiter, climb and descent. By extrapolating the footprints and 
geometric footprint approximations derived in §3.3, it is possible to obtain the aggregate footprint for a given 
phase of flight. By combining the aggregated footprints for a series of phases it is then possible to construct 
the aggregate footprint for a mission. Note, that in the following equations 𝑨𝑭𝒐𝒐𝒕𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒕 refers to the footprint 
area as calculated using Eq.(5) or Eq.(6) depending on the initial height of the aircraft AGL. 
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3.4.1. Approximating the Impact Footprint for a Cruise Phases of Flight 
 
Cruising flight is assumed to comprise straight and level flight at a constant height AGL. Thus, the 
aggregated footprint can be readily obtained by translating the footprint along the x-axis (i.e. along track 
axis) as shown in Fig.4. It can be seen that the two parameters needed to determine the aggregated footprint 
are the height AGL H and the cruise distance d (which can be derived from the assumed constant velocity 
and time spent in this phase). The aggregated footprint area can be approximated using: 
 𝐴!"#$%& = 2𝑏!𝑑 + 𝐴!""#$%&'# (7) 
where, b1 is the maximum across track displacement and AFootprint is the footprint area (at a single instance in 
time). This approximation model is empirically verified for the Cessna 172 and Aerosonde aircraft against 
the 6DoF simulation. The relative error in the footprint area and Maximum Across Track Distance b1 
between the geometric template model and the 6DoF simulation are shown in Table 1. The average 
computation time is just 0.0159s on an Intel Core 2.66GHz mobile CPU. From Table 1, it can be seen that 
the relative error between the results computed using the geometric primitive and the results computed using 
the 6DoF simulation are very small, typically less than 1% for initial heights of 1000ft AGL. 
 
Figure 6. Aggregated Impact Footprint for a Cruise Phase of Flight (H = 1000ft, d = 10NM). 
 
 
Table 1. Relative Error in the Aggregated Footprint Area and Maximum Across Track Distance For Cruise Flight 
(Comparison Between Geometric Model and 6DoF Simulation)  
 
d 
Cessna 172    H Aerosonde    H 
100ft 1000ft 5000ft 100ft 1000ft 5000ft 
10NM 5.2% 0.07% 0.41% 0.24% 0.22% 0.40% 
50NM 5.2% 0.21% 0.32% 0.18% 0.20% 0.29% 
100NM 5.2% 0.24% 0.30% 0.17% 0.19% 0.24% 
1000NM 5.2% 0.26% 0.27% 0.16% 0.18% 0.19% 
b1 relative error 5.2% 0.26% 0.27% 0.16% 0.18% 0.18% 
 
3.4.2. Approximating the Impact Footprint for a Loiter Phase of Flight 
 
A loiter is assumed to consist of a circular track of radius R at constant height AGL. The aggregated 
footprint is then found by translating and rotating the footprint along the circular track. This creates an 
annulus shaped aggregated footprint, which is a function of the footprint across-track “width” as shown in 
Fig.7. The footprint area is calculated using Eq.(8). This approximation method is empirically verified 
against the outputs from the 6DoF model (Table 2). The average computation time is 0.01s. 
 
 𝐴!"#$%& = 𝜋(𝑅 + 𝑏!)!𝜋 (𝑅 + 𝑏!)! − 𝜋(𝑅 − 𝑏!)! 𝑅 < 2𝑏!𝑅 ≥ 2𝑏! (8) 
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From Table 2, it can be seen that the relative error between the results computed using the geometric 
primitive and the results computed using the 6DoF simulation are very small. The error grows with 
decreasing altitude (typically H < 500ft AGL). This is due to the increasing relative error between the 
approximation provided by the high altitude footprint model and the 6DoF model as H tends to zero. 
 
 
Figure 7. Example Aggregated Impact Footprint for a Loiter Phase 
 
Table 2. Relative Error in the Aggregated Footprint Area and Maximum Across Track Distance For Loiter Flight 
(Comparison Between Geometric Model and 6DoF Simulation)  
 
R 
Cessna 172    H Aerosonde   H 
100ft 1000ft 5000ft 100ft 1000ft 5000ft 
0.1NM 5.2% 0.49% 0.53% 0.24% 0.36% 0.36% 
0.5NM 5.2% 0.41% 0.51% 0.12% 0.32% 0.35% 
1NM 5.2% 0.33% 0.49% 0.16% 0.28% 0.34% 
5NM 5.2% 0.26% 0.35% 0.16% 0.15% 0.28% 
b1 relative error  5.2% 0.26% 0.27% 0.16% 0.18% 0.18% 
 
3.4.3. Approximating the Impact Footprint for a Climb or Descent 
 
In modelling the aggregated footprint area for a climb or descent phase of flight, it is assumed that the 
aircraft climbs/descends at a constant rate and in a straight line. Unlike the cruise and loiter phases, the shape 
and size of the footprint changes as the aircraft changes altitude.  
 
The parameters used to characterise a climb/descent consist of the initial height AGL H1, the final height H2, 
and the distance d over which the climb occurs. By tracing the outermost boundary of the union of all 
individual footprints Ai, it is possible to find the overall footprint. This is shown in Fig.8. and Eq.9. The 
geometric approximation model is again empirically verified against the results obtained from the 6DoF 
simulation (Table 3). The union of footprints takes more time to compute, approximately 0.28s on average. 
 𝐴!"#$%  !"  !"#$"%& = 𝐹 𝐴!!!!…!  (9) 
Again, it can be seen that the relative error between the results computed using the geometric primitive and 
the results computed using the 6DoF simulation are very small (Table 3). The results presented in Table 3 
show that the aggregated geometric primitive provides a good approximation to the results generated by the 
computationally more expensive 6DoF simulation. 
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Figure 8. Example Aggregated Impact Distribution for a Climb Phase 
 
Table 3. Relative Error in the Aggregated Footprint Area and Maximum Across Track Distance For a Climb/Descent 
(Comparison Between Geometric Model and 6DoF Simulation)  
 
H 
Cessna 172    d Aerosonde     d 
8055m 4985m 3198m 8055m 4985m 3198m 
100ft to 1500ft 0.57% 0.18% 0.24% 0.31% 0.31% 0.31% 
1500ft to 4500ft 0.42% 0.42% 0.42% 0.42% 0.42% 0.42% 
4500ft to 1500ft 0.42% 0.42% 0.42% 0.42% 0.42% 0.42% 




This section has described the development of geometric templates/primitives that can be used to 
approximate the maximum boundary and area of the distribution of possible ground impact locations for a 
fixed wing aircraft. As shown by the example scenarios, the results obtained from the geometric templates 
have a low relative error when compared to the results calculated using a 6DoF model. The footprints can be 
extrapolated to describe a range of flight phases and missions with computation times of less than a second. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
Assessments of the risk to people on the ground are a key input to the development of airworthiness 
regulations for UAS. These assessments should include measures of the CR, IR and SR. A review of the 
commonly used measure of CR, IR and SR was provided. Based on the review, it was determined that the 
model must be capable of describing the distribution of possible impact locations, given a failure at a 
particular point in the flight plan. Existing models either do not take the impact distribution into 
consideration, or propose computationally expensive methods for its calculation. A computationally efficient 
approach for estimating the boundary (and in turn area) of the impact distribution for fixed wing UA was 
proposed. A series of geometric templates that approximate the impact distributions are derived using an 
empirical analysis of the results obtained from a 6DoF simulation. The impact distributions can be 
aggregated to provide impact footprint distributions for a range of generic phases of flight and missions. The 
maximum footprint areas obtained from the geometric template model are shown to have a relative error of 
typically less than 1% compared to the areas calculated using the computationally more expensive 6DoF 
simulation. Computation times for the geometric models are on the order of one second or less, using a 
standard desktop computer. Future work includes characterising the distribution of impact locations within 
the template impact footprints. 
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